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Democratic South Africa was born amidst high hopes for the reduction of income 
poverty and inequality from their high levels under apartheid.  The reality has been 
disappointing: despite steady economic growth, income poverty probably rose in 
the late 1990s before a muted decline in the early 2000s, income inequality has 
probably grown, and life expectancy has declined. The proximate causes are clear: 
persistent unemployment and low demand for unskilled labour, strong demand for 
skilled labour, an unequal education system, and a social safety net that is 
unusually widespread but nonetheless has large holes. It is also clear that 
economic growth alone will not reduce poverty or inequality. Pro-poor social 
policies are important, but not as important as a pro-poor economic growth path.  
Unfortunately, there is little sign of the political conditions changing to push the 
state towards the promotion of a more pro-poor pattern of economic growth.  
There is some chance of parametric reforms of the welfare state. Overall, however, 
it is likely that, after another ten years of democracy, unemployment and poverty 
rates will remain high, despite significant redistribution through cash transfers, 
and incomes will continue to be distributed extremely unequally. 
 
 
Introduction: Hopes and claims 
 
Apartheid’s legacy to the democratic South Africa included highly visible income 
poverty and inequality.  Income poverty was not high by the standards of the rest of 
Africa.  The proportion of the South African population with incomes below the 
equivalent of US$1 per day (adjusted for local purchasing power) was about 24 
percent, compared to about 50 percent in countries such as Kenya, Swaziland, 
Uganda and Senegal, 72 percent in Madagascar, and 85 percent in Zambia.1  But it 
was much higher than other middle-income countries. The comparable poverty 
rates in Chile, Mexico and Indonesia were about 15 percent, and in Jamaica, 
Malaysia and Tunisia they were about 5 percent. Only Brazil matched South Africa 
(UNDP, 1999: table 4).  Income poverty was strikingly visible in South Africa 
                                                 
1 No national data on food consumption are collected in South Africa, so it is not possible to 





because it coexisted with great affluence, amidst high inequality, and also because 
this inequality correlated with race.  Even though some African people had enjoyed 
rapid upward income and class mobility in the last years of apartheid, the formerly 
disfranchised African majority was, for the most part, poor, whilst the small white 
minority that had held power was conspicuously rich.  
 
Apartheid had perpetuated income poverty and exacerbated income inequality in 
very obvious ways. African people had been dispossessed of most of their land, 
faced restricted opportunities for employment or self-employment, were limited to 
low-quality public education and health care, and were physically confined to 
impoverished parts of the countryside or cities. At the same time, the white 
minority had benefited from discriminatory public policies. It was hardly surprising 
that South Africa competed with Brazil and a handful of other countries for the 
indignity of having the most unequal distribution of income.  Poverty did not exist 
alongside affluence, because segregation kept the rich and poor apart, but they 
certainly coexisted in the same country (see Wilson and Ramphele, 1989; Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005).  Observers from all parts of the political spectrum turned to 
crudely dualistic descriptions of this reality, distinguishing between the ‘first’ and 
‘third world’ parts of the country or analyzing the political economy in terms of 
‘internal colonialism’ or (more bizarrely still) ‘colonialism of a special type’. 
 
Democratisation was therefore accompanied by high hopes that income poverty 
and inequality would be reduced.  The poor were to be enfranchised, the pro-poor 
and pro-black African National Congress (ANC) would be elected into office, and 
public policies and private practices would be deracialised.  The ANC promised ‘a 
better life for all’ in its 1994 election campaign. Its election manifesto – the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – promised that ‘attacking 
poverty and deprivation’ would be ‘the first priority of the democratic 
government’. The RDP would empower the poor to seize opportunities ‘to develop 
to their full potential’ and ‘to sustain themselves through productive activity’, with 
the state ensuring improved access to social security, public education and other 
services.  All South Africans should enjoy ‘a decent living standard and economic 
security’ (ANC, 1994: 15, 16, 79). 
 
The ANC-led government adopted a modernist approach to the challenge of 
development. The apartheid state never collected data on poverty among African 
people, but even before the 1994 election the ANC joined with the World Bank and 





and expenditure survey.  After taking office, the ANC-led government immediately 
transformed the parastatal statistics agency (renamed Statistics South Africa) and 
invested heavily in the collection of statistics on poverty, first through the October 
Household Surveys (OHSs) and Income and Expenditure Surveys (IESs), and later 
the General Household Surveys (GHSs), as well as on labour market issues 
(through dedicated Labour Market Surveys or LFSs). A major study of poverty and 
inequality was commissioned in 1995-96. A range of public policies were 
reoriented around ‘developmental’ concerns. 
 
Socio-economic rights were also included in the 1996 constitution. Section 27 
specifies that ‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to (a) health care services, 
…; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.’  
Section 28 stipulates specific rights for children, and Section 29 establishes rights 
to education.  These and other rights are said to be based on the ‘democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom’ (section 7, para 2). The Constitutional 
Court has stated that realizing socio-economic rights is necessary if citizens are to 
enjoy the other rights enshrined in the constitution and if South Africa is to become 
a society based on the above values. 
 
The ANC and government were quick to claim that they had made progress.  In the 
1999 elections, the ANC campaigned around the general theme that South Africa 
was ‘changing’, although this change needed to be ‘speeded up’ (Lodge, 1999).  In 
2003, in an assessment anticipating ten years of democratic government, the 
government acknowledged that poverty had grown but implied that this was more 
than offset by redistributive measures (South Africa, 2003).  In the 2004 elections, 
the ANC claimed that it had laid the ‘foundation for a better life’, including two 
million new jobs and expanded public services.  It called on citizens to vote for it 
‘so that together we can do more to achieve a Better Life for All’. Its election 
manifesto – entitled ‘A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty’ – 
emphasized the creation of ‘a more caring society’ and a ‘radical’ reduction in 
unemployment and poverty (ANC, 2004).  The following year, a senior ANC 
member (and billionaire) Cyril Ramaphosa was quoted as saying that new data 
showed that South Africans had ‘never had it so good’ (SAARF, nd). In May 2006, 
President Mbeki himself told Parliament that ‘between 1994 and 2004, the real 





(Mbeki, 2006).  More detail was provided in the government’s ‘discussion 
document’ on ‘Macro-Social Trends’: ‘[T]he proportion of people with low 
(poverty) income increased marginally during the period 1993 to 2000’, the 
government conceded, but recent research ‘shows that there has been a marked 
decline in poverty since 2000, from approximately 18,5 million poor people to 
approximately 15,4 million poor people in 2004’ (South Africa, 2006: 12).   
 
This positive representation of progress since 1994 contrasts with the negative 
assessments made by a long series of unashamedly left scholars.  In the most recent 
version of this critique, the ubiquitous journalist John Pilger proclaims that 
‘apartheid did not die’ (Pilger, 2006). Affluent spaces in the new South Africa 
might be populated by black people wearing matching Gucci sunglasses and suits 
alongside still privileged white people, Pilger claims, but the lives of the poor were 
unchanged, to the extent that the poor – or ‘poors’, as they are sometimes called 




The rise and fall of income poverty 
 
Discerning what has ‘really’ happened to income poverty and inequality is difficult 
even without its politically explosive implications.  Despite – or rather, to some 
extent, because of – the explosion of data in post-apartheid South Africa, there is 
no consensus on trends. Obvious and not-so-obvious flaws in the data mean that the 
data have to be ‘decontaminated’ (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 3), and this requires 
complex assumptions and methodological innovations (see Seekings, 2006c). 
 
There is, nonetheless, broad academic consensus that income poverty worsened in 
the late 1990s, although precise findings vary according to the specific data used 
and assumptions made in the analysis. The UNDP (2003), using the 1995 IES and a 
2002 LFS, found that the absolute number of poor people had grown but the 
proportion of people living in poverty had declined marginally. Meth and Dias 
(2004), using expenditure data from the 1999 OHS and a 2002 LFS, found that 
both the number and proportion of households and individuals living in poverty had 
risen.  Leibbrandt et al. (2004), using census data, conclude similarly that both the 
numbers and proportions of poor people had grown. Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and 
McClary (2005), analysing individual-level incomes using the 1995 IES/OHS and 





fact that the share of household expenditure spent on food rose gives additional 
credibility to the decline in real incomes.  Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) use data on 
real per capita expenditures from the same surveys as Leibbrandt et al. to show that 
the number of poor people grew between 1995 and 2000. ‘By 2000, there were 
approximately 1.8 million more South Africans living on less than $1/day and 2.3 
million more living on less than $2/day’ (ibid: 87). The total poverty gap also 
increased.  This academic consensus is contrary to most of the claims made by the 
ANC and government but consistent with the criticisms made by Pilger and others.   
 
Almost the sole dissenting voice on this trend came from the South African 
Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), which proclaimed boldly that 
‘Government is delivering’ and they had ‘the figures to prove it.’  The figures came 
from the SAARF’s bi-annual All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), which 
collects data for the advertising and marketing industry. Using AMPS data, SAARF 
categorises consumers into different ‘Living Standard Measures’ (LSMs) based on 
income, wealth, and standard of living.  Between 1994 and 2001, the proportion of 
South Africans in the bottom LSM category dropped from just under 20 percent to 
5 percent. This is the finding that prompted Ramaphosa to remark that South 
Africans had ‘never had it so good’ (SAARF, nd). Sensibly, however, the 
government retreated in 2006 to concede that poverty had risen in the late 1990s 
(South Africa, 2006). 
 
The overall growth rate of the South African economy speeded up somewhat in the 
early 2000s, fuelling hopes that poverty might decline.  In 2005, Van der Berg et al. 
began to circulate a study (published in 2006) that put forward a dissenting 
analysis: ‘On the basis of the available evidence we have no doubt that there has 
been a noticeable decline in poverty in the last few years’ (van der Berg et al., 
2006: 23). Using a methodology that they describe as ‘not uncontroversial’, they 
claim to have demonstrated that poverty may have risen slightly in the late 1990s 
but then declined after 2000, especially between 2002 and 2004. Their finding 
holds for a variety of measures of income poverty – although, they note at one 
point, ‘we may be at risk of overestimating the progress that has been made’ (ibid: 
29).   
 
In a detailed riposte, Meth (2006a) argues that Van der Berg et al. underestimate 
substantially the numbers of people in poverty.  Meth concedes that the proportion 





that the rise in poverty in the late 1990s was larger than Van der Berg et al. admit, 
and the fall in poverty in the early 2000s was lower than they claim.  
 
The sensitivity of poverty rates to changes in social assistance is in large part 
because, first, South Africa’s poor have such low incomes, relative to the rich, and 
second, there are many poor people just below (as well as just above) any of the 
widely-used poverty lines, so that quite small changes in incomes can raise people 
above the lines. Bhorat (2003a), using 1995 IES data, calculated that the poverty 
gap in 1995 had been just R13 billion, using a poverty line of R293 per person per 
month. This amounted to 10 percent of government spending at the time, meaning 
that the government could eliminate income poverty entirely if it increased its 
expenditures by just 10 percent and allocated all of the additional funds to perfectly 
targeted transfers to the poor. Between 1995 and 2004, the government did 
substantially increase its real expenditure on well-targeted social assistance 
programmes (as we shall see below).  Van der Berg et al. and Meth agree that this 
resulted in some reduction in income poverty, but they disagree on the extent. 
 
Van der Berg et al. and Meth reach very different findings because they respond 
differently to the fundamental deficiency in the existing data on incomes in South 
Africa. ‘Stripped to its barest essentials,’ observes Meth pithily, ‘the (income) 
poverty controversy in South Africa is about how to deal with the problem of 
under-reporting’ (Meth, 2006a: 40). Surveys and censuses fail to collect complete 
or credible information on some households (in the sample, in the case of surveys) 
and fail to collect any data on others. Overall, the incomes recorded by the censuses 
and surveys fall far short of the national income derived from the national accounts. 
 
If under-reporting was consistent over time, it might not matter to the analysis of 
trends in income poverty.  But if under-reporting seems to change over time, then 
any analysis of changes in the data collected must try to distinguish between the 
real changes in incomes over time and the changing level of reporting. There are at 
least three reasons to believe that under-reporting has changed over the post-
apartheid period.  First, the growth in aggregate income reflected in IES data from 
1995 and 2000 is considerably lower than the growth in national income recorded 
in national accounts (Van der Berg et al., 2006). Secondly, non-response or 
incomplete response rates seem to have risen over this period (Ardington et al., 
2005). Thirdly, recent Statistics SA surveys make much less of an attempt to 
reconcile households’ reported data on incomes and expenditures. There are also 





sections of the population who are under-counted and the categories of income 
which are under-counted. It appears that rich people have become less and less 
willing to provide data (Seekings, Nattrass and Leibbrandt, 2004), and property 
income is counted less and less (Simkins, 2004).  
 
Studies by Leibbrandt et al. (2004) and Ardington et al. (2005) illustrate one way 
of building models that address these problems. They report that 19 percent of 
households reported zero incomes and another 4 percent provided incomplete 
income data in the 1996 Population Census, and 23 percent and 5 percent of 
households did so in the 2001 Population Census (Leibbrandt et al., 2004: 41).  
They do not believe that many households really have zero income.  The decision 
over whether to include the zero-income households and missing-data households 
clearly makes huge differences to poverty rates – either in terms of headcounts or 
poverty gaps – in either year.  But it makes little difference to the trend between 
1996 and 2001. If these households are included in the analysis, poverty 
headcounts and the poverty gap rise; if they are excluded, poverty headcounts and 
the poverty gap rise (ibid: Appendix A).  In a second paper, Ardington et al. (2005) 
impute data where income data are missing in the 2001 Census.2  This results in a 
reduction in estimates of poverty (but an increase in inequality, as measured using a 
Gini coefficient). When they also substitute imputed data for zero-income 
households, it makes no statistically significant difference to poverty rates.  This is 
because the imputed income remains zero for most of the affected households.  
Ardington et al. conclude by showing that, if they use imputed data for both 1996 
and 2001, both poverty headcounts and income inequality rise over the 1996-2001 
period. 
 
Van der Berg et al. (2006) employed an entirely different (and ‘not 
uncontroversial’) methodology. Their model-building entails three stages.  First, 
they accept the veracity of national accounts data on the overall growth of national 
income.  Any inconsistency between trends in IES data and the national accounts 
would be a major cause for concern (although Hoogeveen and Özler (2006: 61) 
report that the IES expenditure data is consistent with GDP data). Van der Berg et 
al. argue convincingly that ‘it appears implausible that [average or aggregate] 
household incomes have declined to the extent suggested’ by raw IES income data.  
                                                 
2 Statistics SA provides imputed data, but using a single hotdeck imputation.  Ardington et al. 
instead use a multiple imputation approach.  The former means that missing values are replaced 
by values from similarly responding sampling units.  The latter means that missing values are 





They conclude that comparing income data from IESs ‘is likely to lead to erroneous 
conclusions regarding trends in poverty’ (ibid: 14). Their response is to disregard 
entirely the trend in IES income data and accept uncritically the trends in national 
accounts. Second, Van der Berg et al. use data from national accounts and other, 
non-survey sources to calculate inter-racial income distribution, i.e. the shares of 
national income accruing to white, Indian, coloured and African people.  They find 
that African people’s share of total income rose sharply after 2002, faster even than 
their share of the population. The third stage in Van der Berg et al.’s methodology 
entails using the AMPS market research data on intra-racial income distribution.  
Crucially, the AMPS data suggest that intra-racial income inequality within the 
African population peaked in 2000 and declined thereafter (although overall 
inequality rose steadily throughout the period).  The combination of declining intra-
African inequality with a rising African income share generates the result that poor 
people fared especially well. Poor African people got a larger share (i.e. relative to 
non-poor African people) of a growing African share of the total pie (i.e. relative to 
non-African people).   
 
Each stage in Van der Berg et al.’s methodology is open to challenge. As Meth 
writes, ‘it is not obvious why the magnitude of adjustments resulting from such a 
procedure should bear any resemblance to the size of actual under-reporting errors 
by income or expenditure class (which, all agree, are likely to plague any survey 
instrument)’ (Meth, 2006a: 10). The accuracy of Van der Berg et al.’s work 
depends on the accuracy of their data on inter-racial and intra-African distributions. 
This remains to be demonstrated.  One would have more confidence in their 
findings if they showed why AMPS data on intra-African income distribution, 
collected for the advertising and marketing industry, suffers from fewer flaws than 
the data collected in dedicated surveys by Statistics South Africa. Meth (2006a) 
tries to identify what assumptions would need to be made about Statistics SA 
survey data to produce the kind of results provided by Van der Berg et al. using 
other sources and methodologies. He concludes that Van der Berg et al.’s estimates 
require assumptions about under-reporting that are beyond the bounds of 
plausibility. 
 
A major concern with any survey is the difficulty in interviewing rich households.  
This has major implications for the inter-racial distribution of income, as it is (on 
average) harder to collect information from (richer) white South Africans than 
(poorer) African South Africans. The standard response to this problem is to re-





Hoogeveen and Özler, 2006). This implies that non-response within the re-
weighting categories is random. Non-random non-response within the re-weighting 
categories might have major implications for any analysis that requires data on 
distribution. Van der Berg et al. (2006) agree that the African ‘middle class’ has 
experienced dramatic growth. If AMPS data underestimates the growth of 
prosperity among rich African people, then Van der Berg will overestimate the 
benefits of growth that accrue to poor African people.  Small underestimates in the 
size or prosperity of richer Africans mean that there have been proportionately 
large overestimates in the incomes of poor Africans: underestimating the income of 
richer Africans by R100 per month is a small underestimate, but overestimating the 
income of poorer Africans by the same amount transforms all of the poverty 
estimates.  Leibbrandt et al. (2005) provide some information that is consistent 
with this hypothesis. Concerned that their finding of declining real individual 
incomes between 1995 and 2000 might be the result of bad data, they examine the 
educational attainment of age cohorts in the 1995 and 2000 cross-sectional surveys.  
They find statistically significant declines in years of schooling for a number of 
cohorts, although they assess that the decline (of about half-a-year) is insufficient to 
explain more than a small part of the decline in income.  Leibbrandt et al. do not 
seem to consider the possibility that the missing respondents from the second 
survey might have been drawn disproportionately from the ranks of upwardly-
mobile African people. Under-sampling this category in 2000 would result in 
underestimates of mean incomes in 2000 (and hence might explain some of the 
discrepancy between the trend from survey data and the trend from national 
accounts data) and of changes in intra-racial inequality across this period, although 






Figure 1: How often did a child in the household 























Statistics SA has collected some subjective data on poverty that has a bearing on 
this. The GHSs ask respondents whether, ‘in the past twelve months’, any child had 
gone ‘hungry because there wasn’t enough food’. Respondents had to choose 
between five response options: never, seldom, sometimes, often and always.  
Responses in households with children indicate clearly that reported child hunger 
declined over quite a short period of time (see Figure 1).  Reported hunger among 
adults also declined. Unfortunately, it is not possible to trace this series back before 
2002 (as previous surveys either included no such questions or used significantly 
different wording). 
 
It is premature to reach any precise conclusion on poverty trends in the early 2000s.  
The work by Van der Berg et al. is innovative and instructive.  It is very likely that 
weak employment growth and a sharp increase in pro-poor public expenditure on 
social assistance programmes did lead to a reduction in income poverty, but the 
scale of these is unlikely to be as large as Van der Berg et al. estimate (and as they 
themselves warn). Trends in the late 1990s might have corroborated the criticisms 








High (and worsening) inequality 
 
Income inequality worsened after 1994, including in the early 2000s. This trend has 
been found by studies using a variety of data-sets, and stands in contrast to the 
picture of stable levels of overall income inequality in the final decades of 
apartheid. Leibbrandt’s calculations using the 1995 and 2000 IESs showed that the 
Gini coefficient – i.e. a widely-used measure of inequality, which can vary in value 
from an egalitarian 0 to an inegalitarian 1 – for household per capita income rose 
by about five percentage points over five years, from 0.65 to 0.7 (Seekings et al., 
2004). The Gini coefficient for expenditure rose, but by less (Hoogeveen and Özler, 
2006: 60). Leibbrandt et al. (2004: 9) compared data from the 1996 and 2001 
Population Censuses, also finding that the Gini coefficient rose by five percentage 
points, from 0.68 to 0.73. Simkins (2004) corroborates both the IES and Census 
findings. Even Van der Berg et al. (2006), whose findings on poverty rates are 
contentious, found that their model of income distribution indicates that overall 
income inequality rose through the longer 1994-2004 period. 
 
The Gini coefficient might not be the most appropriate measure of income 
distribution in the South African case, as it is reportedly less sensitive to changes at 
either end of the income distribution and more sensitive to changes in the middle.  
South Africa’s rich are unusually rich and South Africa’s poor are exceptionally 
poor, even relative to other unequal societies. If the poor are getting relatively 
poorer, therefore, the Gini shows less change than alternative measures of 
distribution, such as the mean logarithmic deviation (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006: 
72). There are also, as I have already suggested, grounds for suspecting that the 
weights used in survey and census data do not pay adequate attention to the 
(probably growing) problem of low response rates among rich, and therefore 
necessarily upwardly-mobile, African households. This would lead to an 
underestimate of the growth of both intra-African and overall income inequality. 
 
In 1998, Mbeki famously described South Africa as a ‘two-nation’ society: ‘One of 
these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic 
dispersal. … The second and larger nation … is black and poor, with the worst-
affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general, and 
the disabled.’ These two ‘nations’ were distinguished by unequal access to 
infrastructure of all kinds, and unequal access to opportunities (Hansard, House of 
Assembly, 29th May, 1998, col.3,378).  In a detailed analysis of the changing nature 





and I argue that the basis of inequality had shifted from race to class long before 
1998 (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). Apartheid served to transform the state-
imposed privileges of being white into the advantages of class that were rewarded 
by markets, ensuring that the white elite became a middle-class whose continued 
privileges no longer depended upon active racial discrimination by the state.  This 
shift meant that the state could dismantle policies of racial discrimination without 
undermining white privilege. This, in turn, meant that growing numbers of black 
South Africans could be upwardly mobile into the middle classes. Privilege no 
longer correlated with race, as suggested by Mbeki’s use of the ‘two nations’ 
analogy. 
 
The Theil index is a measure of inequality that allows for overall inequality to be 
decomposed into ‘within-group’ and ‘between-group’ components. Applied to 
South African racial categories, this decomposition distinguishes the shares of 
inequality arising from inter-racial as opposed to intra-racial differences.  
Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000), using census data on incomes, showed that the 
between-race share declined from 62 percent in 1975, to 42 percent in 1991, and 33 
percent in 1996, whilst the within-race share rose commensurately, from 38 percent 
to 58 percent to 67 percent. Leibbrandt did similar calculations using the 1995 and 
2000 IESs (Seekings et al., 2004; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 308).  The trends in 
between- and within-race shares proved to be highly sensitive to the choice of 
weights (which were used primarily to compensate for low response rates among 
white households). Using his preferred weights, Leibbrandt showed that the 
previous trend continued, with the between-race share falling and the within-race 
share rising.  Hoogeveen and Özler (2006: 74) show the same for expenditure data.  
Leibbrandt et al. (2004: 9) use the 1996 and 2001 Population Censuses. Although 
their estimates for 1996 are different to those of Whiteford and Van Seventer, they 
find that the existing trend continues: the within-race share rises, and the between-
race share falls. Bhorat et al. (2006: 45) have similarly decomposed asset inequality 
into within-race and between-race components. They construct a poverty-oriented 
asset index comprising characteristics of accommodation (roof, walls, etc), 
infrastructure (such as use of electricity) and other assets (television, car, etc).  The 
between-race share of inequality in asset ownership declined from 37 percent in 
1993 to 18 percent in 2004, whilst the within-race share rose commensurately from 
63 percent to 82 percent.  The evidence supports the unsurprising conclusion that 
the removal of racial constraints has led to continuing upward mobility among 





differences within the African population are becoming more important as inter-
racial differences decline.  
 
Changing racial income dynamics can also be examined through changes in racial 
income shares and in the racial composition of rich income deciles. Data on income 
shares are ambiguous.  Between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, the African income 
share (i.e. the share of national income received by African people) rose steadily, 
whilst the white income share declined. The 1995/2000 IES data suggest that this 
trend continued, although the pace of change depends on the selection of weights 
(Seekings et al., 2004). Van der Berg et al. (2006) reached a similar assessment.  
But the 1996/2001 census data suggest a stabilization (see Leibbrandt et al., 2004: 
10).  Because of differential rates of population growth, however, the ratio of white 
to African mean incomes per capita probably actually widened (see ibid: 11; Van 
der Berg et al., 2006).  The data on the racial composition of the top income deciles 
is more emphatic. Both the 1995/2000 IES data and the 1996/2001 Census data 
suggest that African people comprised a fast-growing proportion of the top two 
income deciles (Seekings et al., 2004; Leibbrandt et al., 2004: 11). The rich are no 
longer all white, even if almost all white people are still rich.  
 
 
Human development, AIDS and life expectancy 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of well-being developed by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and reported in the UNDP’s 
annual Human Development Report. Figure 2 shows the absolute HDI for South 
Africa together with South Africa’s ranking relative to other countries.3 The trend 
is clear: the South African HDI rose steadily in the last years of apartheid, peaked 
around 1995, and then declined steadily, at least until 2003 which is the most recent 
year for which data are available at present. South Africa’s declining HDI meant 
that its global rank slipped dramatically, from 90th in 1994 and 89th in 1995 to 121st 
(in 2004). 
 
                                                 
3 The global ranking by HDI is from various UNDP Human Development Reports, up to and 
including the 2006 HDR (UNDP, 2006); the South African HDI scores and decomposition are 
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The HDI comprises three components: an ‘educational attainment index’ 
constructed out of adult literacy rates and gross school enrolment rates; a ‘life 
expectancy index’ derived from data on life expectancy at birth; and an index of 
GDP per capita taking into account purchasing power. The UNDP selected these 
variables for the HDI because they were readily measured and together provide a 
good indication of the reality of social and economic well-being in a country or 
region. The rapid decline in South Africa’s absolute and relative HDI is entirely 
due to the rapid decline in life expectancy.  In 2003, South Africa ranked 52nd in the 
world in terms of GDP per capita (taking into account purchasing power), 78th on 
the composite education index, but 150th on life expectancy. The reason why life 
expectancy has declined is AIDS, which has rolled back the gains of decades of 
development in Southern Africa (see Nattrass, 2002). By 2010, it is estimated, 
AIDS will have reduced life expectancy at birth in South Africa by twenty years: 
without AIDS, it would have been 68 years, with AIDS, it will be 48, or perhaps 
even less.  
 
Life expectancy should be a far more important component of studies of income 
poverty and inequality than is currently the case, because of both changes in 
average life expectancy over time and inequalities in life expectancy across society.  
Studies of income poverty and inequality are rightly concerned with an individual’s 
or household’s income over time: chronic poverty is very different to transitory 
poverty, in terms of both the experience for the people concerned and the 





The tardiness of the South African government in providing treatment for the AIDS 
sick and using ARVs to slow the spread of the pandemic (see Nattrass, 
forthcoming) constitutes a massive indictment of post-apartheid policy. 
 
 
Causes of poverty and inequality: unemployment 
and education 
 
Poverty in South Africa is rooted in deagrarianisation and unemployment.  South 
Africa’s poor are not land-holding peasants, supplementing subsistence production 
with occasional sales of agricultural produce, casual employment or remittances 
from migrant labour.  South Africa’s peasantry was slowly destroyed in the course 
of the Twentieth Century (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: chapters 3 and 6).  Forced 
removals from large commercial farms, overcrowding in the ‘homelands’ or 
‘bantustans’, low-quality schooling, poor links into urban and industrial labour 
markets, and the growing capital-intensity of production in most economic sectors 
resulted in the growth of unemployment among unskilled workers and of mass 
poverty among them and their dependents.  Large-scale open unemployment seems 
to have replaced underemployment in the 1970s, and then grew steadily through the 
1980s and early 1990s (ibid: chapter 5).  Surveys conducted around 1994 suggested 
that the unemployment rate was less than 20 percent, using a strict or narrow 

























Unemployment rates rose steadily under post-1994 ANC governments, at least until 
2002.  Figure 3 shows unemployment using the narrow and broad definitions; the 
1993 data come from the 1993 PSLSD survey, 1994-1999 data from OHSs, and 
2000-06 data from the LFSs conducted in September of each year.  Unemployment 
peaked in early 2003 at 31.2 percent (by the narrow or strict definition, including 
only active job-seekers) and 42.5 percent (using the broad or expanded definition, 
including also people who want employment but are not looking for it in 
supposedly ‘active’ ways).4  By the early 2000s, more than 4 million people were 
unemployed by the narrow definition and about eight million were unemployed by 
the broad definition.  Unemployment rates have dropped marginally since 2002/03, 
but unemployment rates remain much higher than they were in 1994 and are higher 
than anywhere else in the world excepting Iraq.   
 
The coincidence of steady (albeit low) economic growth, rising unemployment 
rates and apparently stagnant employment growth led many commentators to 
                                                 
4 The LFS uses a rotating panel, which raises questions about attrition.  If people who lose jobs or 
are new entrants to the labour force are more likely to attrit than people in steady employment, or 
if unemployed people are less likely than working people to be included in the new part of each 
panel, then there is likely to be a tendency both to underestimate unemployment and to 





describe the South African economic experience in terms of ‘jobless growth’.  
Given that trade liberalization contributed to job losses in unionized sectors, 
COSATU joined the chorus of critics of the government, whose policies were said 
to have produced a ‘jobs bloodbath’. Bhorat argues against such conclusions.  
Using data from post-1993 household surveys (the OHS and LFS), he argues that 
total employment has risen, with as many as 2 million net new jobs created 
between 1995 and 2003 or 2004 (Bhorat, 2003b; Oosthuizen, 2005; Bhorat and 
Oosthuizen, 2006). Casale, Muller and Posel (2004, 2005) show that about one-
third of this employment growth is the product of changes in measurement (with a 
more inclusive definition of self-employment). The actual jobs created divide 
almost equally between the survivalist (i.e. very low-income) informal sector and 
the formal sector. This is why rising employment did not lead to a drastic reduction 
in poverty, but rather resulted in a growing number of ‘working poor’. By 2003, 
almost one-third of employed South Africans reported earnings that were lower 
than the statutory minimum wage for a domestic worker.  Overall, it is clear, recent 
economic growth has not been markedly more pro-poor than growth in previous 
decades. 
 
The effects of unemployment on poverty are accentuated by the growth of an 
‘underclass’ of people who suffer systematic disadvantage in the labour market 
with the result that they face no real possibility of escaping from poverty (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005: chapter 8).  For many unemployed people, poverty is transitory, 
ending when they find employment.  But others lack the skills (including language 
skills), credentials and (especially) the connections (i.e. social capital) which are 
crucial in terms of securing unemployment. These others comprise the underclass.  
Probably the most important form of social capital is having family or friends who 
have jobs and are able to help someone find employment.  It is therefore especially 
worrying that the number and proportion of the unemployed living in ‘workerless’ 
households, i.e. where no one is in wage employment, have risen. Oosthuizen 
(2005: 47) reports that the number (and proportion) of unemployed people living in 
workerless households, using the broad definition of unemployment, rose from 1.8 
million (42 percent) in 1995 to 4 million (49 percent) in 2004 (see also Pirouz, 
2005).  In the mid-1990s, most of this underclass of workerless households was 
located in the former ‘bantustans’.  Rural-to-urban migration has resulted in some 
relocation of poverty to town (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 4), probably indicating 






Education is a second immediate cause of income poverty and inequality. Lam 
(1999) showed that most of South Africa’s very high inequality in income 
distribution could be explained in terms of differential rates of return to education 
and unequal grade attainment. Although the bulk of the population has already left 
school, the education and skills of new entrants to the labour force are of great 
importance in shaping the ways that inequalities evolve over time.  In 2006, the 
official pass rate in the matriculation (i.e. ‘matric’ or grade 12) school-leaving 
examination was 66.5 percent. In the early 2000s, pass rates rose sharply, but a 
large part of this was because the matric exam became less demanding.  Even 
though the 2006 exam was probably easier than exams a decade earlier, the pass 
rates in key subjects remained very low (Taylor, 2007).  More alarmingly, surveys 
show that only a minority (about 40 percent) of each age cohort completes 
successfully grade 12 (and some respondents might say they have completed grade 
12 even if they did not actually pass matric).  The median grade attainment among 
young people in their mid-20s, i.e. at an age when as many have taken matric as 
will ever do so, is grade 11, and almost one in three young people have attained 
grade 10 or less (according to 2005 GHS).   
 
More worryingly still, it is very unclear what skills are associated with any 
particular level of grade attainment, including even matric. Only 5 percent of the 
half-million candidates who wrote their matric examination in 2006 passed 
mathematics at the higher grade. Only one in four of the students who passed 
matric passed mathematics at either the higher or standard grade (Taylor, 2007).  
Data from the Cape Area Panel Study shows that there is a very weak correlation 
between the grade in which students are enrolled and their scores in numeracy and 
literacy tests. Many students are promoted into higher grades without having 
mastered basic numeracy and literacy. The results are shown in cross-national 
research on skills.  In the 2003 round of the Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMSS), South African grade 8 students performed worse in 
both science and mathematics tests than their counterparts in every other country 
that participated, including Egypt, Botswana and Ghana.  Indeed, the 75th percentile 
in South Africa achieved about the same score as the 25th percentile in Botswana 
(Reddy, 2006). Other cross-national studies provide a similarly worrying and 
unambiguous message: South Africa peforms poorly in comparison even with some 
of its much poorer neighbours. In the 2000 round of SACMEQ, South African 
grade 6 students performed worse in reading and mathematics than their 
counterparts in Mozambique, Botwana, Swaziland, Tanzania and elsewhere 





The reasons are clear.  Most South African schools provide a very low quality of 
education. In some cases, the quality is clearly constrained by inadequate 
conditions. But in most cases, the redistribution of public resources from schools in 
rich neighbourhoods to schools in poor neighbourhoods (as shown by Van der Berg 
above) has removed the most glaring inequalities in conditions. What remains are 
inequalities in family background – which South Africa shares with many other 
countries in the global South – and inequalities in the classroom that result from 
differences in the quality of teaching and the level of student discipline (both of 
which are probably affected by the quality of school management). The 
restructuring of the school curriculum after 1994 has certainly not improved the 
quality of education, and may in fact have exacerbated inequalities, because 
teachers in schools in poor neighbourhoods often lack the skills or motivation to 
apply the new curriculum.  
 
Despite considerable expenditure on public education – amounting to about 7 
percent of GDP – most young South Africans leave school and enter the labour 
market with limited skills. They are not equipped for semi-skilled or especially 
skilled employment. Given that the economy continues to restructure around skilled 
employment, there is a serious mismatch between the supply and demand for 
labour. This fuels unemployment among the unskilled, and low earnings among 
those unskilled workers who are lucky enough to find jobs. 
 
 
Pro-poor social interventions 
 
The decline in income poverty in the early 2000s appears to be due, primarily, to 
the expansion of social assistance, i.e. tax-financed, non-contributory programmes 
providing for the elderly, the disabled, and poor parents with young children.  Since 
1994, there have been no substantive changes in the basic design of the public 
welfare system, and the real value of the major grants is slightly below their value 
in 1994.  But in the early 2000s the government has increased substantially its total 
expenditure on social assistance and reached many more poor people.  Expenditure 
on social assistance almost doubled from about 2 percent of GDP in 1994 (and 
2000) to about 3.5 percent in 2005 (see Figure 4).5  
                                                 
5 Figures 5 and 6 are based on data from Pakade (2006) and various issues of the Budget Review 
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Figure 5 disaggregates the growth in numbers of beneficiaries between the major 
programmes. There was little change in the number or pattern of beneficiaries until 
2000. Thereafter there was an extraordinary explosion in the number of 
beneficiaries, but this was almost entirely due to the growth of child support grants 
being paid out. The child support grant, although modest in value, very quickly 
reached ten times the number of children reached by its predecessor, the state 
maintenance grant. By April 2006 – i.e. the most recent actual data – about 7 
million child support grants were paid monthly, compared to just 230,000 child 
allowances under the state maintenance grant at the peak year of 1998.  Figure 5 
also shows the slow but significant rise in disability grants. There has been less 
change in the pattern of actual expenditures, because the child support grant is so 
modest in value compared to the other grants.  Nonetheless, in 2003-04, for the first 

























These social assistance programmes have a major effect on poverty because they 
are well-targeted on the poor, as Van der Berg (2001, 2005a, 2006a) shows.  
Almost 60 percent of social assistance expenditure goes to households in the 
poorest income quintile. About 30 percent are shared between households in the 
second and third income quintiles, and households in the richest two income 
quintiles receive just 10 percent. Well-targeted cash transfers amounting to about 
3.5 percent of GDP inevitably have a major effect on poverty rates. 
 
Other areas of government social expenditure are also progressive. Van der Berg 
applies standard analysis of fiscal incidence to government spending on education, 
health and housing (where the benefits are in kind, in the form of free or subsidized 
education, health care and housing) as well as social assistance (entailing cash 
transfers). In 1997, Van der Berg (2001a) estimates, 33 percent of total social 
spending in 1997 went to the poorest household income quintile, compared to just 8 
percent for the richest household income quintile. This was marginally more pro-
poor than in 1993, when 31 percent went to the poorest quintile and 12 percent to 





share of the poor meant a substantial increase in real spending on them.6  Van der 
Berg subsequently (2005a) repeated his earlier analysis using data from the 1995 
and 2000 IESs, showing that the share of social spending on the poorest income 
quintile rose marginally between these dates.  
 
The problem with fiscal incidence analysis is that it apportions government 
spending among different sections of the population without assessment of the 
actual value of this spending to the poor (see ibid: 39-43).  Government spending in 
South Africa is pro-poor primarily in the sense that the government pays salaries to 
teachers working in schools in poor neighbourhoods and to doctors and nurses in 
public clinics and hospitals. Health spending might be an effective means of 
assisting the poor, but it is far from clear what benefit the poor actually receive 
from the considerable funds spent on teachers’ salaries.  It is clear that schools in 
rural areas, and many urban areas, provide a very poor education, and that there is 
at most a weak relationship between spending on schools and the actual quality of 
education. Indeed, pro-poor spending on education might be viewed more 
accurately as pro-teacher spending, not pro-poor spending (Seekings, 2004). 
 
There has also been a dramatic improvement in access to water, electricity and 
housing (Leibbrandt et al., 2004; Bhorat et al., 2006; Seekings, 2006b). The 
number of households with electric connections doubled between 1993 and 2004; 
the number with telephones rose almost threefold (through the spread of cell 
phones, not fixed landlines). Access to water and sanitation improved, as did access 
to formal housing (in terms of the number of households in formal housing but not 
in terms of the proportion of the total number of households). The most recent 
household survey, the 2005 GHS, indicates continuing progress in infrastructural 
delivery between 2002 and 2005 (Stats SA, 2006; also Business Report, 1st June 
2006). Critics charge that many poor households have been disconnected from the 
new services or evicted from their new homes because they have been unable to 
pay (McDonald, 2002). But a careful study of water services concluded that the 
number of people affected by cut-offs because of non-payment is very much lower 
than critics claimed (Hemson and Owusu-Amponah, 2006). 
                                                 
6 Van der Berg (2005a: 1) subsequently summarised his initial research as showing that ‘the first 
years after the political transition to democracy saw a large and significant shift of social 
spending from the affluent to the more disadvantaged members of society’, although his own 
published data did not support this precise conclusion (see also Van der Berg, 2006a: 216).  He 
should have written that the benefits of increased spending accrued largely to the poor, in terms 





The area of service delivery in which the state has been most obviously and 
consequentially negligent is health, especially AIDS-related healthcare and the 
provision of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). By stalling the roll-out of ARVs and 
failing to organize government publicity around the threat of HIV/AIDS, the 
government has failed to prevent the explosion of ill-health and death among 
people who are still young (Nattrass, forthcoming). Life expectancy, as we have 
seen, has plummeted since the early 1990s. Whilst rich people can get ARVs, if 
necessary through private medical aid schemes, the poor suffer, lose incomes, and 
die young.  There can surely be nothing as fundamental to inequality as this. 
 
 
The unchanging distributional regime and 
growth path 
 
The disappointing progress in reducing poverty (and inequality) has not been due to 
the lack of pro-poor social assistance, or even slow economic growth (although 
faster growth would be better for everyone). Accelerated land reform would have 
little effect on poverty rates. Continuing poverty and inequality are, rather, the 
product of the overall economic growth path, which has continued to be capital- 
and skill-intensive. Continued adherence to the growth path of the apartheid period 
inevitably results in continuing poverty in a context of massive unemployment, 
especially among the less skilled. The global context encourages inegalitarian 
patterns of economic growth, but public policies also play an important part in the 
South African case.   
 
Policies and institutions regulating wages and working conditions shape the growth 
path. The post-apartheid government announced with great fanfare the introduction 
of ‘new’ labour legislation in the late 1990s: a Labour Relations Act in 1995, the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, the 1998 Employment Equity Act, 
and the Skill Development Act of 1999.  Notwithstanding their claimed novelty, 
the Labour Relations Act and Basic Conditions of Employment Act essentially 
extended existing legislation, introduced to protect unionized, skilled and semi-
skilled white workers in the 1920s, to protect unionized, skilled and semi-skilled 
African workers. This deracialisation is clearly just, in many senses. But in 
deracialising the legislation that formerly protected the privileges of an elite of 
white workers, the state was introducing legislation that would ensure privileges for 





vestiges of a division between insiders and outsiders inside the workplace were 
moved outside of the workplace, so that the (formally) employed were now all 
insiders whilst the unemployed, casual workers and informally employed remained 
outsiders. Policies and institutions that affect wage determination and working 
conditions also serve to promote a capital-intensive, and relatively jobless, growth 
path, insofar as they push up labour costs, especially among unskilled workers, and 
provide incentives to employers to substitute capital for labour and skilled for 
unskilled labour. 
 
Labour market policy has negative effects on the demand for unskilled labour in 
two major ways. First, industrial relations procedures result in very high costs to 
employers of dismissing labour. By one estimate, it costs business 1 percent of 
GDP to dismiss workers each year, and three times the number of work-days are 
lost through dismissal procedures than through work stoppages. Some of the labour 
lawyers responsible for drafting the relevant labour legislation have spoken out 
against the gap between what they intended and what has ensued.7 Secondly, wages 
are negotiated in centralized, sector-based Bargaining Councils, which are 
dominated by the large, more capital-intensive employers together with the trade 
unions who have a common interest in setting wages at high levels to eliminate 
competition from small, less capitalised and less organized employers.   
 
The government itself has slowly shifted toward accepting the need for labour 
market reform. In 1999, the government initiated a review of labour legislation, but 
only very minor reforms were implemented. In the same year, the Minister of 
Labour introduced very minor changes to the regulations affecting small businesses 
employing less than ten workers.  Most recently, in mid-2005, ANC leaders finally 
declared their intention of tackling the ‘holy cow’ of labour market policy. A 
discussion document, tabled at a major ANC conference in 2005, proposed 
excluding small employers from some regulatory requirements and from the 
sectoral wage deals negotiated between large employers and unions. Such reform 
of labour market policy has been strongly opposed by the ANC’s powerful allies 
COSATU and the South African Communist Party, who lobbied strongly against 
them at the conference, and secured a final resolution that left labour market reform 
off the immediate agenda.8 
 
                                                 
7 Financial Mail, 18 February 2005, pp.34-35; 4 March 2005, p.26. 





The precise extent to which labour market policies serve to advantage employed 
insiders at the expense of unemployed outsiders is unclear.  Much of the evidence 
and argument presented in defence of current labour market policies is much less 
decisive than their champions believe.  But nor is the evidence that labour market 
policies restrict job creation conclusive. The argument against labour market 
policies essentially rests on the absence of any alternative explanation of why 
profit-seeking South African employers do not choose to invest in labour-intensive 
production techniques that entail large-scale employment of unskilled labour, but 
instead invest again and again in capital-intensive production that entails modest 
employment of skilled or semi-skilled labour. If wages or hidden labour costs (such 
as the costs of dismissal) are not high in South Africa, or if the labour market is 
really as flexible as some pro-union researchers claim, then why is there not more 
employment of cheap, unskilled labour? 
 
 
Prospects for the second post-apartheid decade 
 
Since the end of apartheid the South African economy has grown steadily, at a 
modest rate, and there is no reason to expect this to change. As Meth (2003) has 
shown, however, even sustained economic growth offers few benefits to the poor if 
a country starts in a position of massive unemployment-based poverty.  The modest 
job creation resulting from growth is unlikely to do much more than absorb new 
entrants to the labour force, with the result that any decline in the unemployment 
rate will be slow. Meth (2006b) points out that the ANC’s 2004 election promises 
to halve unemployment and poverty rates by 2014 are simply not achievable within 
the policy framework to which the ANC seems committed. 
 
Growth is necessary but not sufficient for poverty-reduction. To have a significant 
effect on poverty, the benefits of growth must be ‘shared’. This is precisely what 
the government proposed in a strategy developed in 2005 and launched in early 
2006, under the leadership of the Deputy-President (Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka).  
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) 
envisaged achieving the goals of halving poverty and unemployment rates through 
increasing the economic growth rate (to 6 percent p.a.) and sharing growth, 
primarily through absorbing more labour into the ‘mainstream economy’. Key 
elements of the plan included increased public investment in infrastructure, 
accelerated skill development, and reducing the regulatory burden on small and 





It seems implausible that these will suffice to generate shared growth. AsgiSA 
emphasized primarily skills development, in another reiteration of the skills-led 
growth strategy that the ANC has followed since the early 1990s. There is no 
discussion in AsgiSA of the effects of wage levels.  Any jobs created under AsgiSA 
are likely to be high-skill, high-wage jobs, are therefore unlikely to make much of a 
dent on unemployment, and are unlikely to result in the benefits of growth being 
shared with the poor.  A related problem is identified in the first report on progress 
under AsgiSA. In this report, the government notes that poverty is concentrated in 
the former Bantustans, where there is no likelihood of significant formal 
employment creation. Poverty reduction therefore requires either massive migration 
out of those areas to the towns where formal jobs could be created, or targeted 
public works programmes in the former Bantustans, or expanding grants or 
employment subsidies for working-age unemployed adults (South Africa, 2007a: 
28). AsgiSA promises to share growth primarily through upgrading the skills of a 
small number of people.  Sharing growth more widely would require massive low-
wage job creation or the expansion of the welfare state.  
 
Various parts of the state have commissioned a plethora of studies of aspects of the 
labour market, with the intention of assessing the constraints on job-creation. Most 
of this research is commissioned from scholars with close links to the trade union 
movement, and most concludes that there is little evidence that union-friendly 
legislation that raises wages (and other costs of employment, including especially 
costs of retrenchment) has a marked effect on employment (e.g. Altman and 
Valodia, 2006; Godfrey, Maree and Theron, 2006; Pollin et al., 2006).  Most of this 
research is unsatisfactory, in that it ignores contrary evidence. More curiously, 
however, when these same researchers turn to the question of what policy reforms 
to recommend, many of them suggest wage subsidies, which implies that they 
believe that lower wages in certain sectors or occupations would result in job 
creation.  Parts of the state – most notably the National Treasury – support wage-
subsidies in a range of contexts. For example, in its proposals to expand the 
contributory retirement fund system to cover low-wage workers, the National 
Treasury suggests that the additional costs of contributions should be offset by 
wage subsidies (of up to R5,000 per worker p.a.) (South Africa, 2007b).  It would 
seem that debates on job creation are politically over-determined.  The power of the 
trade unions within the ANC Alliance – and perhaps in the Department of Labour 
itself –precludes serious discussion of expanding low-wage employment in both the 
ANC’s policy deliberations (as we noted above) and government documents such 





as a mechanism for achieving both high wages and lower labour costs to 
employers. 
 
In 2003, the Department of Labour commissioned Nattrass to assess the 
experiences of other countries that had powerful trade unions but had nonetheless 
overcome a severe employment crisis. Nattrass (2003, see also Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: chapter 11) examined the experiences of the Netherlands and 
Ireland, in both of which organized labour was a participant in a social pact or 
accord. In these two cases, organized labour agreed to wage restraint and labour 
market reforms in return for tax concessions and policies to promote skills 
development and training.  In South Africa, however, organized labour has already 
achieved these benefits without having to concede anything in return. As Nattrass 
concluded, the South African government had handed over its bargaining chips for 
free. 
 
In this context of an entrenched and poor-unfriendly economic growth path, 
significant poverty-reduction is likely to require a further expansion of the welfare 
state, i.e. redistribution through the budget.  It has been the expansion of social 
assistance programmes in the early 2000s that resulted in the recent decline – of 
uncertain scale – in poverty.  Van der Berg et al. (2006), whose positive findings 
on poverty rates were used with alacrity (and uncritically) by the government, 
suggest that there is little scope for further increases in cash transfers to the poor, so 
there is unlikely to be much more decline in income poverty.   
 
Van der Berg et al. rightly sense that senior ANC and government leaders are 
ambivalent about, if not hostile to, cash transfers. Government ministers do now 
often take pride in what Mbeki has called the ‘third pillar’ of the government’s 
strategy. The first pillar is the promotion of ‘the growth and development of the 
First Economy’; the second is addressing ‘the challenges of the Second Economy’, 
referring to un- and under-employment. The third pillar comprises ‘building a 
social security net to meet the objective of poverty alleviation’. But ministers and 
officials continue to denounce rising expenditure on ‘handouts’, which (they assert) 
lead to a culture of ‘dependency’ and ‘entitlement’. The government is said to be 
spending ‘too much’ on social assistance, and the move to a ‘welfare state’ is to be 
resisted (South Africa, 2006b; ANC, 2007). The National Treasury’s proposals to 
expand the contributory welfare system (South Africa, 2007b) are driven in part by 






But the government is under some pressure to expand public welfare provision, 
primarily on account of the constitutional commitment to income security. In 2004, 
the Constitutional Court ordered the state to desist from discrimination against non-
citizens who had permanent residence in South Africa. In 2006, cases were brought 
against the state challenging the exclusion of men aged 60-64 from the old-age 
pension (on the basis that women of the same age were eligible) and the age-limit 
of fourteen years on the child support grant.  Required to justify the shape of the 
welfare state, the state argues that it is targeting its scarce resources on those groups 
who are most ‘disadvantaged’ and/or most ‘vulnerable’. The state’s normative 
framework is defensible, but its empirical case is flawed (Seekings, 2007), and it is 
likely to have to extend the reach of old-age pensions as well as raise the age-limit 
on eligibility for child-support grants (as the ANC itself appears to recognize, see 
ANC, 2007). Whilst the state can limit the overall size of the welfare state through 
allowing the real value of benefits to decline, the parametric reform of social 
assistance through incremental extensions of existing programmes would serve to 
plug some of the holes in the safety net and reduce poverty levels. 
 
If the welfare state is to be extended in ways that reduce poverty without providing 
significant disincentives to people to provide for themselves, then it should 
probably extend child support grants to children aged fourteen and fifteen (i.e. ages 
when children are required to attend school) and reduce the pension age for men to 
at least sixty, and perhaps even further, especially in rural areas.  Men and women 
without skills, above the age of 50 years, and living in rural areas are unlikely to 
find employment again. Removing them from the labour force would have few 
costs other than the direct costs of the cash transfers themselves. Indeed, this would 
also have the political benefit to the state of reducing the unemployment and 
poverty rates – and thus helping to attain the goals that the ANC set in 2004 – 
without actually increasing employment. If the means-test for the non-contributory 
old-age pension is abolished, as the National Treasury proposes (South Africa, 
2007b), then reducing the age of eligibility would not serve as a disincentive either 
to work (for the minority who have a real option) or to save for one’s retirement.  
My own crude calculations suggest that the cost of extending the child-support 
grant would be approximately 0.15 percent of GDP, and the cost of lowering to 
fifty years the age at which people receive an old-age pension would be 
approximately 1.5 percent of GDP, bringing the total cost of social assistance to 
over 5 percent of GDP. The total number of grants paid monthly would rise from 





receiving grants would rise from almost one quarter to almost one third.9  The net 
additional costs would be lower if the real value of the old-age pension was 
allowed to decline, which could be defended in an environment of expanding 
coverage, or if the age of eligibility was reduced only in rural areas. I have not 
estimated the effect on poverty-reduction, but it is safe to assume that it would be 
massive. 
 
A more radical suggestion is to introduce a minimum or basic income grant (BIG).  
In 2002, the government-appointed Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive 
System of Social Security for South Africa (the Taylor Committee) recommended 
the introduction of a BIG of R100 per month, to be phased in on condition that 
administrative costs could be contained (South Africa, 2002; see also Seekings, 
2002; Standing and Samson, 2003).  The government dismissed the proposal, with 
its powerful spokesperson, Joel Netshitenzhe, telling the media that the government 
has a rather different ‘philosophy’. Able-bodied adults should not receive 
‘handouts’, but should be helped to ‘enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the 
rewards of work’ (Sunday Times, 28th July 2002; see also Matisonn and Seekings, 
2003; Makino, 2004; Meth, 2004). But the BIG continues to have significant 
backers in the churches and, especially, the trade union movement. Trade unions 
have a material interest in (as well as an ideological commitment to) the 
socialization of the cost of providing for the poor, even though few of their own 
members are poor themselves (Matisonn and Seekings, 2003). But, whilst trade 
unions and their allies can keep the idea of a BIG on the agenda within the ANC, 
they are very unlikely to be either keen or strong enough to overcome the 
opposition of powerful members of the ANC. If their pressure did intensify, the 
government could almost certainly defuse it by reducing the age of eligibility for 
the old-age pension, which would be a well-targeted and less costly intervention. 
 
                                                 
9 This calculation uses population data by age from 2001 Population Census and estimates 
means-eligibility using 2005 GHS data (and an earnings threshold of R18,000 p.a.).  I estimate 
that 65 percent of men aged 50-59 would be means-eligible, 85 percent of women aged 50-59, 
and 80 percent of men aged 60-64.  The calculation of cost is based on current costs per 
pensioner, and assumes that all means-eligible pensioners receive the maximum amount.  The 
number of old-age pensioners would more than double.  The increase would be larger if the 
means-test was abolished, because a larger proportion of the younger and newly age-eligible 
people would be working than of the currently age-eligible people.  The additional cost of 
abolishing the means-test could easily be recouped through the income tax system, especially if 





The government itself favours public works programmes to reduce poverty among 
the working-age adult population. Public works programmes provide cash incomes, 
but only for those who are able to work and in areas where work is provided. In 
South Africa, trade unions hold sufficient political power to prevent public works 
programmes paying very low wages, which has the effects of limiting the number 
of jobs that can be provided within any given budget, and possibly has disruptive 
effects on existing opportunities to earn a modest income (Seekings, 2006a). 
 
Just as trade union power limits the space for reform of labour market policies and 
for low-wage public works programmes, so it also constrains reform of public 
education.  The power of the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) 
makes it difficult for the state to introduce reforms that reward good teachers and 
ensure that bad teachers either improve their teaching or leave the profession 
(Seekings, 2004). 
 
This discussion of the prospects for policy reform assumes that there are no 
fundamental changes in South Africa’s political system. This seems a reasonable 
assumption. ‘New’ social movements might have emerged around specific 
grievances (Ballard et al., 2006), but it is difficult to imagine any mass 
mobilization around social grants, job creation or the quality of public schooling.  
Nor is there any immediate prospect of an intensification of partisan competition 
for the votes of the poor.  Insofar as voters grow more dissatisfied with the ANC, 
this is likely to lead to a process of overall dealignment (from all parties) rather 
than one of realignment (to an alternative party).  Overall, the prospects for pro-
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